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University of Leeds 
 
1. Introduction 
 
n 1765, Kant issued an Advertisement for the four lecture courses 
he would be delivering in the winter semester of 1765/66, on 
Metaphysics, Logic, Ethics, and Physical Geography (Kant 1905). 
Instead of merely outlining the course syllabuses, Kant prefaced the 
document with what would nowadays be called a ‘statement of 
teaching philosophy’.1 As far as I am aware, this is the only place 
                                                 
1 As a teacher of philosophy, I find this expression profoundly irritating, because of 
the ambiguity between ‘teaching philosophy’, and ‘teaching philosophy’. It also 
makes it almost impossible to use a search engine to find anything about teaching 
philosophy, since most of the hits are statements of teaching philosophy. 
I
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where he explains his approach to teaching,2 and it is an approach 
which (apart from the first point below) is remarkably consistent with 
what professional educationalists consider to be best practice in the 
21st century. 
In view of the radical nature of Kant’s ideas, it is surprising 
how little attention has been paid to them. John Ladd (1982) 
summarises the Advertisement in a general account of Kant as a 
teacher, derived largely from Vorländer’s biography. His main 
purpose is to show that Kant’s approach to the teaching of philosophy 
presupposes that philosophy is very different from other disciplines, in 
that it fosters the independence of thought which is central both to the 
concept of enlightenment and to the concept of the autonomy of the 
will in ethics. Eugene Kelly (1989) provides a complete translation of 
the Advertisement into English, and prefaces it with a few brief 
remarks. Interestingly, Kelly is almost entirely negative about the 
Advertisement. He says that if Kant had submitted it for publication in 
the APA Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy (of which Kelly was 
editor at the time), he would have rejected it, on the grounds that it 
was too long-winded, it contained too much technical terminology and 
it said too little about the content of his lectures. Its only saving grace, 
according to Kelly, was that Kant showed a genuine concern for his 
students. 
The articles by Ladd and Kelly are the only two writings I 
have been able to find which discuss Kant’s Advertisement in any 
detail. In what follows, I shall give a much more sympathetic account 
of Kant’s approach to teaching philosophy, and relate what he says to 
current theories of good practice in university education. 
 
 
2. Students too Young for Philosophy 
 
Kant starts off on the wrong foot by telling his prospective students 
that they are too young to study philosophy, since their understanding 
                                                 
2 Kant’s late work Pädagogik, edited by F.T. Rink, might be expected to contain 
something about teaching philosophy; but in fact it is about the upbringing of 
children, and not ‘pedagogy’ in the modern sense.  
Discourse: Vol. 5, No. 1, Autumn 2005 
67 
and reason are not yet mature enough for it. Being taught philosophy 
too young is the cause of: 
the precocious garrulousness of young thinkers, which is blinder 
than any other form of self-conceit, and less curable than 
ignorance. 
It is unclear from the rest of the document how far Kant believed the 
problem could be overcome. If he seriously believed, with Plato for 
example,3 that there is a minimum age below which philosophy cannot 
be taught without doing more harm than good, then he should not 
have been teaching philosophy to undergraduates at all. And it needs 
to be remembered that students entered university even younger than 
is the norm today—Kant himself matriculated at the age of 16 (Kuehn 
2001, 62). If he merely believed that there was a problem which could 
be addressed by more enlightened teaching methods, then he could 
have been less patronising, and given his students more positive 
encouragement. He should have addressed them directly rather than in 
the third person, as did his contemporary John Stewart at Aberdeen, in 
his Some Advantages of the Study of Mathematics, with Directions for 
Prosecuting the Same of 1748 (Wood 1993, 10–11). Again, he should 
have told them, for example, that they were embarking on a peculiarly 
difficult but rewarding course of study, which he would help them 
through. 
Nevertheless, Kant did believe that it was possible to teach 
philosophy to young people, provided the teaching followed the 
natural order in which the human understanding develops. The 
problem was not so much that undergraduates were too young, but 
that certain preliminary stages had to be gone through before students 
were introduced to philosophy itself. As Kant says:  
                                                 
3 Plato set the minimum age as high as 50 (Republic, 540a), though Socrates was 
perfectly happy to discuss philosophy with youngsters such as Theaetetus. In the late 
1980s there was a public debate as to whether philosophy should be taught at A-
level, with some professional philosophers arguing that, although students were 
mature enough at 18, they were not at 16. In my view, children are more open to 
philosophical discussion before they are subjected to the rigidities of GCSE and A-
level curricula. Some of the most exciting philosophical discussions I have 
witnessed have involved primary schoolchildren using the methods of Matthew 
Lipman (Lipman 1988). Kant (1912a, 146 fn.), seems to backtrack somewhat when 
he says ‘Thus it is quite easy to ground enlightenment [i.e. thinking for oneself] in 
individual subjects through their education; one must only begin early to accustom 
young minds to this reflection.’ 
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The natural progress of human knowledge consists in the 
understanding: 
• first training itself to arrive at clear judgments on the 
basis of experience; 
• then attaining concepts through these judgments; 
• then knowing these concepts through reason, in relation 
to their foundations and consequences; 
• and finally knowing them as a coherent whole by means 
of science [in the German sense of Wissenschaft, 
meaning the systematic knowledge of any discipline]. 
Teaching must follow exactly the same route. 
In other words, students should not be presented with highly 
abstract concepts until they have matured enough to understand them. 
This means starting by making judgments about particular cases, and 
only later bringing them together into a theoretical structure. This is 
good advice for any discipline, and it anticipates modern educational 
techniques, such as problem-based learning, and the use of case 
studies. To give just one example, it is notoriously difficult to teach 
statistics to students of psychology or economics, if it is presented as 
an abstract system which has to be mastered before it is applied. It is 
much better to start by introducing individual statistical techniques as 
and when they are needed for solving particular problems, and only 
later to put them into a theoretical context. Much the same might be 
said of formal logic, which often mystifies students if it is not first 
applied to concrete and relevant examples of reasoning.  
 
 
3. Philosophy and Employability 
 
Kant’s implicit message is that, to be a genuine philosopher, you must 
have attained the last of the above stages. However, this stage is not 
relevant to employability, because Kant agreed with Socrates 
(Xenophon 1923, 1.6.13) that philosophy should not be a paid 
profession (despite the fact that Kant himself received a salary as a 
philosopher): 
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you will clearly see that it is very unnatural for philosophy to be 
a paid profession, since it contradicts its essential nature if it 
accommodates itself to the craziness of market forces or the 
rule of fashion. 
Instead: 
by its very nature, it should essentially be reckoned only as an 
adornment of life, and, so to speak, one of its dispensable 
embellishments. 
According to Kant, one of the evils of modern society was that 
people considered it necessary to be a sophisticated intellectual in 
order to advance in life. There was therefore pressure on the 
universities to give students a semblance of philosophical wisdom, 
without going through the stages necessary for their intellectual 
development. The consequences were dire: 
the students pick up a sort of reason before their understanding 
is fully developed. They wear borrowed scientific knowledge, 
which is, so to speak, draped over them rather than having 
grown within them. Consequently, their mental capacity is as 
undeveloped as it was before, but at the same time it has been 
seriously corrupted by the delusion of wisdom. This is the 
reason why you often come across intellectuals (especially 
academics) who show little understanding, and why universities 
send more dull wits out into the world than any other state 
institution. 
This is strong language indeed, and one wonders what Kant’s 
colleagues would have thought of his addressing his students in such 
terms. Kant was equally rude about (at least some) academics in the 
Critique of Pure Reason. In B172–3, he argues that judgment, or the 
ability to apply rules to particular cases, is an innate ability, which 
cannot be taught. It cannot be taught, because teaching consists in 
supplying ‘rules drawn from the insights of others’, and if the person 
concerned cannot apply rules, they cannot apply any higher-order 
rules as to the exercise of judgment. In a footnote he adds: 
Lack of judgment is essentially what is called ‘stupidity’, and it is 
the sort of handicap which cannot be remedied. If people are 
obtuse or mentally limited simply because they lack the 
appropriate level of understanding, or concepts of 
understanding, they can certainly be improved through 
education, even to the point of becoming scholarly. But since 
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lack of understanding is usually accompanied by lack of 
judgment, it is not unusual to come across very learned people 
who, in the application of their learning, often betray that lack of 
judgment which can never be rectified. 
These ‘scholarly’ and ‘very learned’ people presumably include 
fellow academics. 
So far, Kant has stressed the irrelevance of philosophy to 
employability. The other side of the coin is that all the stages of 
intellectual development necessary to become a philosopher are highly 
relevant to employability, except for the final stage: 
It is expected that a teacher will educate students first to use 
their understanding, then to use their reason, and finally to 
become academics. Most students do not become academics. 
So the advantage of such a method is that, even if students 
never reach the final stage, their education has made them 
better trained and more intellectually accomplished for a non-
university career. 
Indeed, university teachers are neglecting their duty if they do not 
inculcate general intellectual skills: 
The trust of the state is being abused if teachers fail to increase 
the intellectual abilities of the young people in their charge, and 
educate them to their own more mature insight in future, but 
instead deceive them with a supposedly already complete 
philosophy, which was thought up for their benefit by other 
people.  
In other words, teachers should remember that only a small proportion 
of their students are going to become academics. Students should be 
taught in such a way that they all develop their understanding so as to 
benefit them in any later career. This is also essential for those few 
students who are destined to become academics, since they will 
become bad academics if their heads are filled with abstractions 
before they are ready for them—postgraduate training can be left till 
later.  
Again this is good advice. Some academics think of university 
as a training school exclusively for future academics. For example, 
Dennis Hayes (Hayes 2003) writes: 
. . . [the] sole purpose [of the university], as a creator of 
knowledge, is research, and such ‘teaching’ that goes on is 
subject to the requirements of the research process. . . . The 
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only test of the success of university ‘teaching’ is whether it 
produces a new generation of creative and critical academics.4 
Related to this is the widespread feeling among academics (and 
students) that anyone who fails to obtain a reasonable 2.1 is really a 
failure, because they are not qualified to proceed to postgraduate 
research.5 Such an attitude has always been unsustainable, and it is 
even less sustainable in an age of state-supported mass higher 
education. As Kant was aware, philosophy is the ideal subject for 
developing the understanding, or, as we might put it today, for training 
students in ‘transferable’ or ‘key’ intellectual skills and attributes. The 
corollary is that these skills should be made explicit; that teaching 
methods should focus on developing them through the subject content 
of the discipline; and that students should be assessed positively on 
the extent to which they have acquired such skills (as well as 
knowledge), and not negatively on the extent to which they have 
failed to make the grade as potential academics. 
Kant’s biographer, Manfred Kuehn (Kuehn 2001, 358–9), citing 
Rudolf Malter (Malter 1990, 398), tells the following little story, 
which throws further light on Kant’s attitude towards the majority of 
his students in the middle: 
One of Kant’s students reported that he often introduced his 
lectures by saying that he lectured neither for the very bright 
(Genies), because they would find their own way, nor for the 
stupid, because they were not worth the effort, but only for the 
middle, who were seeking to be educated for a future 
profession. 
                                                 
4 See also my reply (MacDonald Ross 2003). 
5 This became very evident during a nationwide consultation carried out in the mid 
1990s by the then Higher Education Quality Council (HEQC). It attempted to 
formulate a definition of ‘graduateness’ which would apply to all graduates, 
whatever their subject and whatever their degree class. The project failed, partly 
because of the difficulty academics had over specifying any positive skills or 
attributes distinguishing graduates with a low class of degree from non-graduates. 
The HEQC’s successor, the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA), took the bit between 
its teeth, and produced ‘qualifications frameworks’, defining minimum standards of 
attainment for all graduates (QAA 2001). Interestingly, these include just the sorts of 
critical and argumentative skills Kant considered to be exclusive to philosophy 
graduates. For further discussion of the qualifications frameworks, see MacDonald 
Ross 2002, 106–111. 
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One might quibble about Kant’s neglect of the extremes—the best 
students can be stimulated to an even higher level of performance, and 
the weak can often be raised to an acceptable level. But his point 
remains that the focus should be on the large majority of students in 
the middle, who are unlikely to become academics. 
 
 
4. Philosophy as sui generis 
 
Kant makes a sharp distinction between the teaching of philosophy 
and that of other disciplines, on the grounds that other disciplines have 
a body of knowledge which can be taught, whereas philosophy does 
not. There is no textbook of philosophy, because there are no 
established philosophical facts. As he puts it: 
Many of those who have learned history, jurisprudence, 
mathematics, and so on, nevertheless decide on their own 
accord that they have not yet learned enough to teach it to 
others. On the other hand, why are there so many people who 
can seriously imagine themselves, in addition to their other 
business, being perfectly able to pontificate about logic, 
morality, and the like, should they wish to get involved in such 
trivialities? The reason is because in the former sciences there 
is a common standard, whereas in the latter everyone has their 
own. 
The mistaken belief that there is a body of philosophical knowledge 
which can be transmitted to students is: 
the origin of an illusory science, which passes for genuine 
currency only among particular people in a particular place, but 
is rejected everywhere else. 
If Kant had been writing after he had developed his critical 
philosophy, he would have had to modify this claim. Although he 
retained the view that metaphysics as a body of transcendent 
knowledge cannot possibly be a science, he came to believe that the 
synthetic a priori knowledge contained in the Transcendental Analytic 
could be taught as a systematic doctrine like any other science. This 
would have been what he confusingly calls his System of Metaphysics, 
which he promised in the Preface to the second edition of the Critique 
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of Pure Reason (Kant 1904, Bxxxvi), but which he never wrote. It is 
confusing because he normally uses the word ‘metaphysics’ in the 
pejorative sense of the illusory science of transcendent reality—God, 
immortality, freedom, and cosmology. So his mature position would 
have to be that there are some philosophical facts in relation to the 
world of experience, but that there is no body of metaphysical 
knowledge about the reality which transcends experience.  
Many philosophers will no doubt disagree with Kant’s claim 
that there is no metaphysical knowledge, and may even see it as 
reinforcing the student relativism they strive to overcome. However, 
this is not a reason for rejecting Kant’s approach to the teaching of 
philosophy, because everyone must at least agree that all claims to 
metaphysical knowledge are contested. This means that students 
cannot become philosophers unless they learn to think and reason for 
themselves, rather than absorb a body of established knowledge, like 
lawyers or medics.  
Elsewhere Kant makes it clear that philosophy is sui generis, not 
merely in the negative sense that it lacks of body of knowledge, but in 
the positive way it develops the habits and skills of rational criticism. 
In What is Enlightenment?, Kant (1912) begins with the following 
clarion call: 
Enlightenment is man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage. 
Tutelage is man’s inability to make use of his understanding 
without direction from another. Self-incurred is this tutelage 
when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution 
and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere 
aude! ‘Have courage to use your own reason!’—that is the 
motto of enlightenment. 
Kant accepts that there are many circumstances when people must toe 
the party line: civil servants and soldiers must do what they are told, 
and pastors must preach the teaching of the church, even when they 
disagree. But in an age of enlightenment, everyone has the separate 
right to function as a ‘scholar’ (Gelehrter), as Kant puts it— that is, to 
publish writings which subject established policies to rational 
criticism.6 And as we shall see, it is this ‘scholarly’ disposition which 
is developed only through the teaching of philosophy. 
                                                 
6 Kant says more about this in 1912a, 144–146. 
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In the Conflict of the Faculties, Kant (1907) argues explicitly 
that the Faculty of Philosophy is superior to the higher faculties of 
Divinity, Law, and Medicine, which are ‘higher’ only in the sense that 
these subjects are studied after a degree in philosophy. Its superiority 
consists in the fact that, whereas the higher faculties merely provide a 
professional training, philosophy uses reason to criticise the very 
foundations and methods of the other disciplines. It is interesting to 
note that, in modern times, research has shown that graduates in 
philosophy are better prepared for postgraduate programmes in 
subjects such as business studies and law than graduates in explicitly 
vocational disciplines (Adelman 1984). 
Kant’s triumphalism about the special nature of philosophy is 
unlikely to endear him to the teachers of other subjects. At least in 
recent times and in the West, it has been the mission of universities to 
produce graduates of all disciplines who are distinguished from mere 
trainees by being autonomous, critical thinkers about their specialism. 
Kant may well have been correct about how students in other faculties 
were taught in the eighteenth century, but the very idea of a university 
has moved on since then. However, the real question is whether actual 
educational practice conforms to the rhetoric. When I said at the 
beginning that Kant’s prescriptions for the teaching of philosophy 
were remarkably close to modern educational theories, I was referring 
to theories about university education in general, covering all 
disciplines. But unlike other social scientists, educationalists are as 
prescriptive as they are descriptive. They are not primarily concerned 
to describe how university teachers actually teach, but how they ought 
to teach if they are to achieve the objectives of a university education. 
The general view is that the traditional format of lecture, seminar, and 
sat examination are not conducive to autonomous critical thinking, 
and that teachers in all disciplines (including philosophy) need to 
change their ways quite radically—and in precisely the way Kant 
recommends. Kant’s claim about the special nature of philosophy 
would have seemed much less outrageous if he had said that 
philosophy is unique in that it cannot be taught by traditional didactic 
methods without turning it into a pseudo-science, and that other 
disciplines would be taught better if they used the methods which are 
necessary for philosophy. 
 
 
Discourse: Vol. 5, No. 1, Autumn 2005 
75 
5. Starting from the Students’ Level 
 
If we now move to Kant’s more specific recommendations as to how 
philosophy should be taught, he says that teachers should take into 
account the level of understanding which students have actually 
attained, and not assume that they have the same level of 
understanding as the teacher: 
But all this must be proportionate to the level of understanding 
which the preceding exercise must necessarily have brought 
about in the students, and not to the level of understanding 
which the teacher observes (or thinks he observes) in himself, 
and which he even falsely assumes to be present in his 
students. 
This may seem obvious, but it is a common failing of teachers in 
all disciplines to assume that students are, or ought to be, capable of 
understanding anything which the teachers themselves can understand. 
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that, in the post-Humboldtian 
university, teaching is supposed to be conducted in the context of the 
latest research, which encourages teachers to talk above the heads of 
their students. However, this ideal can be realised without assuming 
that students are capable of understanding the latest articles in journals 
intended for an audience of professional academics (MacDonald Ross, 
forthcoming). If we are to give students a hand-up towards our own 
level of understanding, we must reach down to where their hands 
currently are. 
It is also worth noting another of Kant’s digs against his fellow 
academics—that they themselves sometimes understand less than they 
think they do.  
 
 
6. Philosophy as an Activity 
 
Kant’s next recommendation comes in the form of a sound-bite: 
students should not learn thoughts—they should learn to think. 
This expresses the essence of Kant’s educational philosophy, and it is 
in complete accordance with the modern stress on active learning. 
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Students should not be the passive recipients of the thoughts of others, 
but they should acquire the ability to think for themselves. Graduates 
who have acquired this ability will continue as life-long learners, 
whereas those who have merely learned what they have been taught 
are unlikely to develop further.  
 
 
7. The Teacher as Guide 
 
There then follows another sound-bite: 
the teacher should not carry [students], but lead them, if he 
wants them to be destined to make progress by themselves in 
future. 
In other words, students will not make any progress after they leave 
university if they passively follow what they have been told. The 
teacher must lead them, in the sense that they are guided to make their 
own progress. This is essentially the same as the modern dictum 
(horribile dictu) that the good teacher should be ‘a guide on the side, 
not a sage on the stage’. 
 
 
8. The Transition from School 
 
Kant then recommends that university teaching has to undo the 
damage done to students by the way they have been taught at school: 
Students come fresh from school, where the method of teaching 
accustomed them to learning. Now they think they will learn 
philosophy; but this is impossible, since they must actually learn 
to philosophise.7  
                                                 
7 Kant makes a similar point in the Preface to the Critique of Pure Reason (Kant 
1904, Bxiii), when he says 'However, reason should not learn from nature like a 
schoolchild, who merely regurgitates whatever the teacher wants, but like an 
authoritative judge, who compels the witnesses to answer the questions he asks 
them.' 
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I am sure that most of today’s philosophers will sympathise with 
Kant’s complaint. Pupils at school are trained to give the best possible 
answers in examinations, at the expense of thinking actively for 
themselves. There are exceptions to this generalisation, but the 
pressure of league tables makes it increasingly risky for 
schoolteachers to encourage originality. When school leavers arrive at 
university, especially in subjects such as philosophy, they are 
confronted with a totally different philosophy of education, in which 
they are expected to involve themselves actively in their own learning, 
and manage their own time. They find it difficult to accommodate 
themselves to an academic culture in which philosophy is something 
you do, rather than something you are taught. Many of them assume 
that the curriculum will be delivered to them through their ears in 
lectures, and they flounder when they are expected to read difficult 
texts critically, and to think for themselves in discussion and when 
writing essays. Unfortunately, Kant doesn’t provide any specific 
recommendations for bridging the interface between school and 
university. 
 
 
9. Philosophy as an Inquiry 
 
Kant’s next recommendation is that: 
The distinctive method of teaching philosophy is zetetic, as 
some of the ancient philosophers called it (from the Greek 
zetein), meaning ‘enquiring’; and it only becomes dogmatic, or 
‘definitive’ in various of its branches when people’s reason has 
already been more practised.  
The term zetetic comes from Sextus Empiricus (Sextus Empiricus 
1933, I.3), who described the sceptical school as: 
the zetetic school, because of its activity in enquiring and 
thinking.  
Here Kant is flagging his indebtedness to Sextus, whose scepticism he 
was familiar with long before he was awoken from his dogmatic 
slumbers by Hume (Kuehn 2001, 48). He agreed with Sextus that we 
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are compelled to believe in the reality of phenomena, but that we can 
never satisfy our desire to know noumena; and the Kantian 
terminology of phenomena and noumena is already there in Sextus 
(Sextus Empiricus 1933, IV.9). Kant’s method of thesis and antithesis 
in the Transcendental Dialectic is exactly the sceptics’ method of 
balancing the arguments in favour of a dogmatic claim with equal and 
opposite arguments against it. In short, Kant’s whole critical 
philosophy can be seen as an attempt to objectivise the world of 
experience against a background of scepticism about our knowledge 
of transcendent reality. 
Kant doesn’t specify which branches of philosophy become 
legitimately dogmatic, but he clearly thinks that students should learn 
in a zetetic way until their reason is fully developed. The implication 
is that, even if philosophy teachers have sufficient grounds for 
supposing that they themselves have access to the objective truth, they 
should not teach it dogmatically, but they should lead their students 
towards it zetetically. This is wholly in accordance with modern 
methods of learning by inquiry, whereby students are led to use the 
research methods of their teachers to construct their own 
understanding of the content of their discipline. 
 
 
10. No Authorities in Philosophy 
 
Kant’s final recommendation is that any course text should be used, 
not as an authority, but as a piece of writing which should be thought 
through and argued with: 
the philosophical author used as a primary text for teaching 
should not be treated as the archetype of judgment, but only as 
an occasion for making one’s own judgment about him, or even 
against him. The method of thinking through the text and 
drawing conclusions from it oneself is essentially what students 
want to be proficient at. Not only can it be useful to them, but 
any definite insights acquired at the same time must be treated 
as incidental consequences, and they only have to plant their 
fertile roots within themselves in order to enjoy an abundant 
harvest. 
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I am not convinced that all students want to be proficient at thinking 
through the text and drawing their own conclusions from it. Many 
would prefer to be told what to think. Nevertheless, Kant makes the 
fundamental educational point that university students, especially in a 
subject like philosophy, ought to apply their own thinking to texts, and 
not merely accept them as delivering a curriculum to be absorbed 
passively. 
Kant is even more radical when he says that any insights 
acquired are incidental. His thesis is that education is primarily about 
developing intellectual competence, and that subject knowledge is 
relatively unimportant. This again is fully in accordance with current 
thinking. 
Kant comes back to this point at the end of the Critique of Pure 
Reason (Kant 1904, B865), in the Architectonic of Pure Reason. Here 
he distinguishes between ‘historical’ knowledge8, when people know 
only what they have been taught, and ‘rational’ knowledge, when their 
understanding has arisen from the use of their own reason. For Kant, it 
is only the latter sort of knowledge that has any value. As he says: 
So suppose someone has, in the strict sense, learned a system 
of philosophy—for example, that of Wolff. They would have in 
their head all the axioms, explanations, and proofs, together 
with the structure of the whole system, and they would be able 
to count everything off on their fingers. However, all they would 
have would be a complete historical knowledge of Wolff’s 
philosophy. They know and judge only as much as has been 
given to them. If you criticise one of his definitions, they won’t 
know how to come up with an alternative one. They have taught 
themselves on the basis of someone else’s reason—but the 
capacity to imitate is not the capacity to be creative. In other 
words, the knowledge did not arise in them from reason. 
Although, objectively, the knowledge is certainly an instance of 
                                                 
8 In English and Latin as well as in German, the term ‘historical’ had long been used 
to contrast the empirical with the rational—for example, the Natural History 
Museum in London contains empirically discovered exhibits, and Hobbes contrasted 
the historical, or empirical, with genuine, deductive science in the Epistle 
Dedicatory to De Corpore (Hobbes 1839, ii). However, here Kant seems to mean 
second-hand knowledge (literally, ‘learned by being told a story’), as contrasted 
with knowledge acquired either by direct experience or by independent reasoning. 
This is made clear in his ‘What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking’ (Kant 
1912a, 141), where he contrasts ‘historical’ belief based on mere testimony with 
knowledge based on empirical evidence.  
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rational knowledge, in the learner as subject it is merely 
historical. They have understood and remembered, that is, they 
have learned well; but they are no more than a plaster cast of a 
living human being. Knowledge that is objectively rational can 
only originally have sprung from the reason peculiar to humans. 
So knowledge in the subject can also be called rational only if it 
is drawn from the universal sources of reason. And the same 
sources, namely principles, give rise to criticism and even 
rejection of what has been learned.  
Kant could hardly make it clearer that mere rote learning is not 
philosophy. For students to become philosophers, they must learn to 
think autonomously and critically.  
 
 
11. Accommodating the Ideal to Reality 
 
Despite Kant’s bold claims about teaching methods, there is no 
evidence that he actually implemented them. Like everyone else, he 
delivered traditional lectures. 
He was operating in a climate in which teaching methods were 
closely controlled by the state. At the beginning of the document, he 
says that the problem of teaching philosophy within these constraints 
‘cannot be completely overcome’. At the end he says that: 
Only extreme necessity, which has power even over 
philosophy, can force it to conform to what is generally 
approved. 
I take this as a confession on Kant’s part that managerial constraints 
prevented him from implementing his ideal philosophical education. 
A quarter of a millennium later, we must ensure that similar 
managerial constraints do not prevent us from fulfilling Kant’s ideals 
in the 21st century. 
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